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Abstract 
This article investigates environmental regulations on eco-industry in vertical oligopolies, in which the upstream 
industry produces abatement goods reducing pollutants and the downstream industry produces consumption goods 
emitting pollutants. We devise the optimal combination of appropriate policy instruments and show that an optimal 
pollution tax should be used for the negative externality and output restrictions in final production, and an optimal 
abatement subsidy should incorporate the effect of upstream market restrictions on abatement activity. We also 
examine the welfare effect of the subsidy policy on the abatement technology in tax/subsidy combination. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent concern over environmental policy in eco-industry has been increasing in part due to the 
importance of environmental technology innovation on pollution abatement. However, imperfect 
competition among environmental firms can restrict the production of abatement goods and thus have a 
direct negative impact on the environment [9]. Appropriate industrial regulation on the eco-industry has 
become an important topic for environmental policy in lessening gross emission. 
The basic framework for environmental taxation on environmental firms in eco-industry was first 
introduced by [1] David and Sinclair-Desgagne. They showed that the market power of the eco-industry 
would bring about a higher pollution tax than the marginal social cost of damage. [2] Canton, et al. 
extended the analysis to the vertical Cournot oligopolies. They showed that if the pollution tax is the only 
available instrument used to regulate these distortions, the second-best optimal tax level depends on the 
market power between the eco-industry and the polluting industry in the vertical structure. 
This article considers the eco-industry and investigates its effect of environmental regulations in 
vertical oligopolies, in which the upstream industry produces abatement goods reducing pollutants and 
the downstream industry produces consumption goods emitting pollutants. We devise the optimal 
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combination of appropriate policy instruments and show that an optimal pollution tax should be used for 
the negative externality and output restrictions in final production, and an optimal abatement subsidy 
should incorporate the effect of upstream market restrictions on abatement activity. We also examine the 
welfare effect of subsidy policy on abatement technology in tax/subsidy combination. 
2. The Basic Model 
2.1. Downstream Industry 
There are n  symmetric downstream firms, indexed by i , where the amount of production of the firm 
is iq . Each firm’s cost function is given by )`( id qC , where 0)( >′ id qC  and  0)( ≥′′ id qC . The inverse 
market demand function of the consumption good is given by )(QP  where ¦
=
=
n
i
iqQ
1
 and 0)(' <QP  
However, production activity generates some pollution, which is denoted by an emission function, )( iqe . 
This is identical for all firms, and it is assumed that 0)(' >iqe  and 0)( >′′ iqe . 
The downstream firms are regulated by environmental tax, t , levied on the amount of emissions. Thus, 
each firm has an incentive to reduce the environmental tax by using a cleanup activity that requires 
purchase of some specific abatement goods ia , sold by upstream firms at a market price of r . We 
assume that the market-clearing price of abatement goods is determined by demand and supply in the eco-
industry. That is, we eliminate the strategic interactions of the downstream firms and thus, they behave as 
price takers at the market equilibrium. The effectiveness of the abatement goods is given by a function, 
)( iaw  which measures the amount of pollution reduced by the purchase of ia . We assume that this 
pollution abatement technology is characterized by decreasing marginal productivity, i.e., 0)( >′ iaw  and 
0)( ≤′′ iaw ; that is, more abatement goods consumed decrease the net amount of pollution with a 
decreasing rate. Then, the net amount of pollution can be defined as )()(),( iiiii awqeaqy −= . Notice that 
we focus on the end-of-pipe pollution abatement, in which abatement activities are additively separable 
from the production process.  
Each downstream firm compete with Cournot manner and wants to maximize its profit function over 
the two variables, iq  and ia , the individual level of the production and the amount of purchased 
abatement goods, respectively. 
),()()(max
,
iiiiidi
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                                          (1) 
The first-order necessary conditions for Cournot-Nash equilibrium output of consumption goods and 
consumption of abatement goods are as follows:  
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2.2 Upstream Industry 
There are m  symmetric upstream firms, indexed by j , where the amount of abatement goods 
produced by the firm is ja . Each firm’s cost function is given by )( ju aC , where 0' >uC  and 0" >uC . 
We assume that upstream firms are supported by an abatement subsidy, s, based on the sales of abatement 
goods.  
Then, given the market price of r , each upstream firm competes with Cournot manner and wants to 
maximize its profit function over the variable ja , the individual level of production. 
jjujj asaCar ⋅+−⋅=Π )(max
                                                      (4) 
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Since all firms in the upstream industry are able to anticipate the behaviors of downstream firms in (2) 
and (3), which are separable decisions, the upstream firms can anticipate the demand of the abatement 
goods. So, the profit function of the upstream firm can be changed to 
jjuji
a
j asaCaawt
j
⋅+−⋅′⋅=Π )()(max  
Furthermore, from the assumption that downstream firms are price-takers in the trade, the eco-industry 
market-clearing price for the abatement goods will be set at ¦¦
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symmetric equilibrium in the downstream market. Then, the upstream firm’s profit function can be 
changed as follows: 
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The first-order necessary condition for Cournot-Nash equilibrium output of abatement goods can be 
written as 
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Then, the symmetric equilibrium for identical upstream firms, in which ji aman ⋅=⋅ , yields the 
following condition: 
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From equation (5), the decision of abatement production is determined by the shape of the pollution 
abatement technology, the marginal cost of producing abatement goods, the number of firms in both 
upstream and downstream industries, and the regulator’s two instruments—abatement subsidy, s , and 
environmental tax, t .  
3. Optimal Environmental Regulations 
Let )(YD  denote environmental damages from pollution, where 0)(,0)(' >′′> YDYD and inyY = . 
Then, social welfare is defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus less the environmental 
damages in (6).  
The regulator’s problem is to choose the levels of output of consumption and abatement goods, 
maximizing the following social welfare function: 
)()()()(max
0,
YDaCmqCnduuPW juid
nq
aq
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The first-order necessary conditions for interior solutions can be written for the optimal allocation as 
follows: 
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Notice that where inqQ = and ji manaA ==  at the symmetric equilibrium. The solutions give the 
principle of marginal optimality, i.e., (7) says that market price of the consumption goods should be equal 
to marginal production cost of consumption goods plus marginal damage of production, and (8) says that 
marginal benefit of abatement goods on the environmental damage should be equal to the marginal cost of 
production of abatement goods. 
Using market equilibrium conditions in equation (2) and the optimality conditions in (7), we have the 
optimal environmental tax: 
)('/)(')()('/)(')( iii qneQQPYDqeqQPYDt +′=+′=      (9) 
If the regulator imposes an emission tax in (9) to downstream polluting firms, each firm produces the 
social optimum production in (7). Then, the optimal environmental tax in (9) is the sum of the distortion 
from environmental damages and the distortion from the downstream firm’s market power per marginal 
emission. As we can see, the first term of environmental distortion is positive and the second term of 
market distortion is negative. Therefore, the environmental tax could be either positive or negative, 
depending on the relative size of the distortions from environmental damages and downstream firm’s 
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market power, where a negative value for the environmental tax would correspond to a subsidy.b Notice 
that when competition is perfect, i.e., ∞→n , where the market power is insignificant, the optimal tax is 
exactly the same as the social marginal damage.  
Similarly, using market equilibrium conditions in equation (5) and the optimality conditions in (8), we 
have the optimal environmental abatement subsidy:  
( )maawawtawYDs iiii /)()()()( ′′+′−′′=        (10) 
If the regulator imposes a production subsidy in (10) to upstream firms in eco-industry, each firm 
produces the social optimum production in (8). Using the optimal tax in (9), we then have the optimal 
abatement subsidy: mmawqeqQPmaawYDs wiiiii /])[(')('/)(/)()(' 'ε−−′′=
 
where 
0)('/)( >′′−=
′ iiiw aawawε , which indicates the relative concavity of the abatement function. 
A few remarks are in order. First, the optimal abatement subsidy in (10’) is also the combination of two 
distortions—environmental damages and downstream firm’s market power—with some weights on each 
distortion. This implies that the optimal abatement subsidy is closely related to the optimal environmental 
tax in (9). However, notice that t is solely determined irrespective of the size of s, while s should be 
adjusted according to the relative size of t. Second, when the downstream market is in a perfect 
competition, the optimal tax is positive, 'Dt =  and the optimal subsidy is also positive, mawDs i /' ′′−= . 
Notice that this subsidy decreases as the number of environmental firms increases. In particular, when the 
upstream market is in perfect competition, i.e, ∞→m , the optimal subsidy is zero. 
4. Example: Monopolistic Innovator  
As an extension, we assume eco-industry consists of one monopolist who innovates the clean technology 
in upstream industry and licenses the patent to downstream firms and charge a usage fee. The innovator 
licenses k out of n firms. Let the licensee firms be denoted by L and un-licensee firms be N. For simplicity, 
we assume that the production cost of downstream firm and upstream are zero and the inverse demand 
function for the final goods is linear, QAQPP −== )(  where ¦¦
−
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and S is the set of 
licensees. Finally, followed by [8] Canton, J., David, M. and B. Sinclair-Desgagne, the emission function 
is assumed as 2)(2/1),( iLiiii aqaqy −= .  
We use a four stage-game to explain the licensing behaviors in the vertical model. At the 1st stage, the 
regulator announces the emission tax t and abatement subsidy s to the downstream market. At the 2nd 
stage, the innovator decides the price of clean technology r and the number of licensed firms k. At 3rd 
stage, after the announcement of emission tax/subsidy rates and the price of abatement technology device, 
polluting firms make a decision whether obtaining a license from innovating firm or not. Finally, at the 
4th stage, given emission tax and the price of clean technology, polluting firms chooses their optimal level 
of )( NiLi qq  and ia (the quantity of abatement device) and compete in Cournot fashion.  
In the followings, we compare the welfare effect of environmental regulation. In particular, we analyze 
whether tax/subsidy combination improves the social welfare, compared than the tax-alone regulation 
under the monopolistic innovator. 
4.1 Downstream Industry 
Licensed firm maximizes the following profit function: 
....,2,1)(
2
)(max 2
,
niwhereaqtraqQP iLiiLiLi
aq i
L
i
=−−−=π .     (11) 
Non-licensed firm maximizes the following profit function:  
...,2,1)(
2
)(max 2 niwhereqtqQP NiNiNi
q Ni
=−=π       (12) 
                                                          
b On this point, see [3] Buchanan (1969) and [4] Barnett (1980) regarding regulating monopolist, and [5] Shaffer (1995) and [6]  
Lee (1999) regarding regulating oligopolies. [7] Requate synthesized important works on pollution tax under imperfect competition. 
All these research provided the rationale for the second-best solution of a higher/lower optimal tax level, depending upon the 
relative effects of distortions, such as market power, excessive entry, and externality 
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From the first-order conditions for (11) and (12), we get the following results: 
)1)(1/()]1()1([ tnttntatkatAq iiLi ++++++−+=  and )1)(1/(])1([ tnttkatAq iNi +++−+= .  
Therefore, )1(/)}]1(){1[( tktnttnrtAtai +++++−+= . 
4.2 Upstream Industry 
First, with the abatement subsidy on clean technology, the innovator’s profit maximization problem is 
)1(/)}]1(){1[(..max
,
tktnttnrtAtatsskarka iii
M
kr
+++++−+=+=π . Then, we have )1/(* tntAr ++= , 
nk =* , and )1(2/)]1()1[(),( **** tktnttnstAtkrai +++++++= . 
Next, without abatement subsidy, the innovator’s profit maximization problem is 
)1(/)}]1(){1[(..max
,
tktnttnrtAtatsrka ii
M
kr
+++++−+==π . Then, we have )1(2/ˆ tntAr ++=  , 
nk =ˆ , and )1(2/)ˆ,ˆ(ˆ nAkrai += . We considered that the number of patents and the price of abatement 
device are determined by the upstream firm. In this condition, monopolist firm sells the patent to all 
polluting firms to maximize profit .  
Therefore, we know that  Li
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4.3 Regulator 
The regulator maximizes the following social welfare function : 
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As a result, we get WW ˆ* > under a positive subsidy to upstream firm. Therefore, a tax-subsidy scheme 
is more efficient than a tax alone.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
This article analyzed the relationship between pollution abatement technology and environmental 
policy in a vertical oligopoly structure, in which imperfect competitions among upstream environmental 
firms and downstream polluting firms are taken into consideration. In particular, we employed the 
appropriate combination of policy instruments, such as emission tax and abatement subsidy, to correct 
simultaneously for the pollution externality and output distortion. We show that a policy combination of 
tax-subsidy scheme is more efficient than a tax alone.  
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